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MECHANISMS FOR RESTRICTING
RECOVERY FOR EMOTIONAL
DISTRESS IN CONTRACT
John D. McCamus*
While the expectancy principle is widely embraced across common law
jurisdictions as a foundational doctrine of remedies law, damages for
mental distress related to breach of contract have either been rejected
outright or limited to variously constructed exceptions in most
jurisdictions. This Article focuses on the policies underlying the rules
and exceptions applied to contractually related mental distress claims
in England, Australia, Canada and the United States. In reviewing the
approaches across these jurisdictions, there does not appear to be a
convincing policy rationale behind limiting the expectancy principle for
emotional distress claims. Indeed, this Article argues that the existing
limitations on the availability for mental distress damages recognized
in the various common law jurisdictions should be abandoned as
artificial attempts to restrict liability and that the traditional common
law principles of causation, mitigation and remoteness are sufficient to
preclude liability in cases where such claims lack merit.
I. INTRODUCTION
The basic principles pertaining to the calculation of damages for
breach of contract enjoy a very substantial consensus across the
common law world. It is generally accepted that the basic objective
of the calculation of damages, or the basic measure of relief, is
expressed in the expectancy principle-the plaintiff should be
placed, so far as money can do so, in the position the plaintiff would
have been in if the contract had been performed.' As is often said,
the plaintiff is entitled to the "benefit of the bargain," a measure of
relief that may reasonably be distinguished from what is often
referred to as the "reliance" measure. The "reliance" measure
indemnifies the plaintiff for out-of-pocket losses occasioned by the
* Professor of Law and University Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University.
1. Robinson v. Harman, (1848) 154 Eng. Rep. 363, 365 (Exch. Ct.).
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breach but not the positive benefits of the bargain of which the
plaintiff has been denied. Further, it is accepted as implicit in the
general principle that the losses for which compensation is to be
granted must be caused by the breach, a principle that is easily stated
but occasionally rather difficult to apply.2
It is also recognized that there are certain principles establishing
limitations on the availability of damages. First, the plaintiff cannot
successfully seek compensation for losses that the plaintiff could
have avoided by making reasonable efforts to curtail the losses that
would otherwise be sustained from the breach? For example, a
purchaser of defective goods who intended to use the goods for
profit-making purposes must take reasonable steps to obtain a
substitute rather than continue to run up losses.4 Losses that could
have been prevented by such action are not recoverable. The
causation and mitigation principles may be interrelated. When a
plaintiff could have prevented losses through reasonable conduct, the
losses resulting from that failure may be considered to have been
caused by the plaintiff.
The doctrine of "remoteness" also provides an important
limitation on the availability of relief. In the classic English
formulation of the rule, the plaintiff is entitled to recover losses that
are foreseeable at the time the agreement is entered, either because
they arise naturally or with sufficient likelihood that the loss can
reasonably be within the contemplation of the parties at the time of
contracting.' Or, where such foresight is dependent on the defendant
being aware of special circumstances under which the agreement was
made, the plaintiff can recover if those circumstances were
communicated to the defendant at that time.6 The requirement that
the potential losses be within the contemplation of the parties either
on the basis of presumed knowledge or knowledge of actual
circumstances communicated to the defendant is often referred to as
the rule in Hadley v. Baxendale.7 Foresight based on presumed
2. A classic study of the problem is found in H.L.A. HART & A.M. HONORE, CAUSATION
IN THE LAW chs. 5, 11 (Oxford Univ. Press 1959).
3. Payzu Ltd. v. Saunders, (1919)2 K.B. 581, 581 (A.C.) (U.K.).
4. Wingold Constr. Co. v. Kramp, [1960] S.C.R. 556 (Can.).
5. Hadley v. Baxendale, (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 151 (Exch. Ct.).
6. Id.
7. Id.
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knowledge is known as the first branch of the rule, and foresight
based on circumstances actually communicated is known as the
second branch.8 Expectancy, causation, mitigation and remoteness
are concepts that are familiar to every common lawyer, and they are
applied with relative uniformity from one common law jurisdiction
to the next.
When one turns to the subject of the present Article, however,
this consensus appears to break down to some degree. To what
extent should the victim of a breach of contract be able to recover
compensation for anxiety, mental distress, annoyance, vexation,
disappointment or emotional disturbance caused by the breach?
There does appear to be an international consensus that such
"injuries," if they are properly described as such, are different and
should be treated differently than the economic losses that more
typically flow from a breach of contract. Thus, it is commonly
accepted as a general rule that injuries in the form of mental distress
or emotional disturbance resulting from a breach of contract are not
compensable.9
Broadly speaking, the reasons for a general principle of this kind
also appear to be the subject of consensus from one jurisdiction to
the next. Such losses are difficult to calculate in monetary terms.
Exposing parties who are negotiating agreements to liabilities of
such uncertain amplitude will unattractively complicate the pricing
and allocation of risks under agreements in ways that may discourage
or increase the cost of commercial activities. Further, parties are
expected to face the disappointment of breach with a certain measure
of equanimity and, accordingly, should accept the risk of such
injuries. For the same reason, some argue that the inability of a party
to handle the disappointment resulting from contractual breach is not
a foreseeable loss.'0
At the same time, the common law jurisdictions under review
here all appear to accept that there are cases where the application of
a general principle absolutely precluding compensation for mental
8. Id. at 145; see Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Principle of Hadley v. Baxendale, 80 CAL. L.
REV. 563, 564-65 (1992) (explaining the legal rule announced).
9. Mara Kent, The Common-Law History of Non-Economic Damages in Breach of
Contract Actions Versus Willful Breach of Contract Actions, 11 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REv. 481,
493 (2005).
10. Douglas J. Whaley, Paying for the Agony: The Recovery of Emotional Distress Damages
in Contract Actions, 26 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 935, 951 (1992).
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distress leads to results that are unacceptably harsh. For example,
consider the following: the claim of a recently married couple against
the wedding photographer who failed to attend the event" (the case
of the "Absentee Wedding Photographer"); the claim of a grieving
family against the undertaker who botched the internment 2 (the case
of the "Incompetent Undertaker"); the claim of a passenger whose
fourteen day cruise is interrupted by the sinking of the tour boat 3
(the case of the "Sunken Cruise Ship"); the claim of a client whose
lawyer fails to seek appropriate remedies against a third party
engaged in a course of harassment or molestation of the client 4 (the
case of the "Incompetent Solicitor"); and the claim against a carrier
whose breach of contract led to the demise of the plaintiffs
cherished pet 5 (the case of the "Grieving Pet Owner"). Such cases
may be considered to "cry out for relief," and in one or more of the
jurisdictions under review, relief for mental distress was awarded.
Once the law starts down this path, however, satisfactory line
drawing between the cases in which relief should be awarded and
cases where it should not may prove to be difficult. For example,
should such relief be awarded to the purchaser of a luxury vehicle
who suffers annoyance because of a seemingly incurable and very
annoying buzzing sound emanating from the vehicle's high-end
audio system? 6 Should an employee who has suffered mental
distress as a result of the manner in which the employer treats the
employee at the time of a wrongful termination of the employment
contract recover damages for mental anguish? 7 The manner in
which various jurisdictions have drawn the line between losses that
are compensable and those that are not has varied over time and, in
recent years, has been subject to some adjustment. After brief
accounts of the current position in England, Australia, Canada and
11. See Diesen v. Samson, [1971] S.L.T. 49 (Sheriff Ct.) (Scot.); see also Wilson v. Sooter
Studios Ltd., [1988] 33 B.C.L.R.2d 241 (Can.), affrd, [1989] 55 D.L.R.4th 303.
12. See Lamm v. Shingleton, 55 S.E.2d 810 (N.C. 1949).
13. See Baltic Shipping Co. v. Dillon (1993) 176 C.L.R. 344 (Austl.).
14. See Heywood v. Wellers, [1976] Q.B. 446 (A.C. 1975) (U.K.).
15. See Newell v. Can. Pac. Airlines Ltd., [1976] 14 O.R.2d 752 (Can.).
16. See Wharton v. Tom Harris Chevrolet Oldsmobile Cadillac Ltd., [2002] 97 B.C.L.R.3d
307 (Can.); cf, Kwan v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc., 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 371 (Ct. App. 1994)
(holding that a seller's breach of contract normally does not entail compensation for mental
suffering absent physical injury).
17. See Vorvis v. Ins. Corp. of B.C., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1085 (Can.).
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the United States, this Article considers the merits of various
possible solutions to this problem.
II. ENGLAND
Evidence of the traditional rule barring recovery for non-
pecuniary loss in contract cases can be found in the absence of cases
awarding such relief in earlier English authorities. 8 However, the
origin of the rule is often traced to a clear statement in the late
nineteenth century decision in Hobbs v. London & South Western
Railway Co. 9
In Hobbs, the plaintiff, his wife and two young children had
taken the midnight train operated by the defendant from Wimbledon
to Hampton Court." The train was rerouted to Esher station where
the plaintiff and his family were left to fend for themselves.2' There
was no other means of carriage available.2 There was no room at a
nearby inn. 3 The family was forced to walk two or three additional
miles to their home from Esher station.24 It was a cold and drizzling
night.2 The plaintiff's wife caught a nasty cold. 6 The jury awarded
£28, consisting of £8 for the inconvenience of being forced to walk
home in these circumstances and £20 for the subsequent illness
suffered by the wife. 7 The Court of Queen's Bench held that the £8
award for inconvenience could be sustained but that the wife's illness
was too remote to justify recovery. 8
The court drew a distinction between physical inconvenience
and mere anxiety or distress, the latter being non-compensable.29
Judge Mellor observed that "for the mere inconvenience, such as
18. See, e.g., Addis v. Gramophone Co., [1909] A.C. 488, 488-89 (H.L.) (appeal taken from
Eng.) (U.K.) (discussing English cases where only pecuniary damages were awarded).
19. (1875) 10 L.R.Q.B. 111, 114 (U.K.); see also Hamlin v. Great N. Ry. Co., (1856) 156
Eng. Rep. 1261 (Q.B.) (stating that in actions for breach of contract, damages must be pecuniary
such that they are capable of being appreciated and estimated).
20. 10 L.R.Q.B. at 112.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 111.
28. Id. at 113
29. Id. at 115.
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annoyance and loss of temper, or vexation, or for being disappointed
in a particular thing which you have set your mind upon, without real
physical inconvenience resulting, you cannot recover damages."3 °
The award of £8 was supported on the basis of the physical
inconvenience suffered by the couple.31
Credit for the general rule (the "Addis principle") is commonly
attributed to the decision of the House of Lords in Addis v.
Gramophone Co.32 The Addis principle states that in a claim for
wrongful dismissal, damages for the plaintiffs injured feelings
resulting from the harsh and humiliating way in which he was
dismissed are not recoverable in English law.33
Over time, exceptions to the "Addis principle" emerged. By
1991, Lord Justice Bingham, in Watts v. Morrow,34 was able to
summarize the then current status of the two well-recognized
exceptions to the general rule in the following terms:
A contract-breaker is not in general liable for any distress,
frustration, anxiety, displeasure, vexation, tension or
aggravation which his breach of contract may cause to the
innocent party. This rule is not, I think, founded on the
assumption that such reactions are not foreseeable, which
they surely are or may be, but on considerations of policy.
. . . Where the very object of a contract is to provide
pleasure, relaxation, peace of mind or freedom from
molestation, damages will be awarded if the fruit of the
contract is not provided or if the contrary result is procured
instead. If the law did not cater for this exceptional
category of case it would be defective....
In cases not falling within this exceptional category,
damages are in my view recoverable for physical
inconvenience and discomfort caused by the breach and
30. Id. at 122 (Mellor, J.).
31. Id. at 111.
32. [1909] A.C. 488 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.).
33. As others have observed, it is doubtful that the opinions rendered in this case plainly
stand for a broad proposition of this kind. See Nelson Enonchong, Breach of Contract and
Damages for Mental Distress, 16 O.J.L.S. 617, 620 (1996), available at
http://ojls.oxfordjoumals.org/cgi/reprint/l16/4/617.
34. (1991) 1 W.L.R. 1421 (A.C.) (Eng.).
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mental suffering directly related to that inconvenience and
discomfort ......
The second of these two exceptions was held to be applicable to
the facts of Watts. 36 The plaintiffs purchased a home in reliance on
the defendant building surveyor's report indicating that the home
should be in reasonably good condition and in need of only minor
repairs.37 The need for more extensive repairs caused the plaintiffs
physical inconvenience and some consequential mental distress.38 In
such circumstances, a modest award for the resulting mental distress
could be sustained.39
Apart from Watts itself, however, very little authority exists that
supports this exception. However, similar results were achieved in
cases where a tenant suffered distress from living in defective
premises4" and where a surveyor's defective report led the plaintiff to
reside in damp premises.'
The first exception is more important in terms of the frequency
with which it has been applied. The exception was developed,
predictably perhaps, by Lord Denning in the well-known decision of
the English Court of Appeal in Jarvis v. Swans Tours Ltd.,42 the case
of the Ruined Holiday. The plaintiff solicitor purchased a Christmas
holiday package from the defendant to go skiing in Switzerland.43
The holiday fell dismally short of the grand claims made in the
defendant's brochure, which the court held to be of contractual force
and effect.44 The court awarded damages for the mental distress and
vexation resulting from the disastrous holiday.45 Lord Denning
observed that the traditional limitations on granting such awards "are
out of date. 46 He asserted that "damages for mental distress can be
recovered in contract, just as damages for shock can be recovered in
35. Id. at 1445 (Bingham, L.J.).
36. Id. at 1422.
37. Id. at 1424-25.
38. Id. at 1427.
39. Id. at 1422.
40. See McCall v. Abelesz, [1976] Q.B. 585 (A.C. 1975) (U.K.).
41. See Perry v. Sidney Phillips & Son, (1982) 1 W.L.R. 1297 (Eng.).
42. [1973] Q.B. 233 (A.C. 1972) (U.K.).
43. Id. at 235-36.
44. Id. at 237.
45. Id. at 233.
46. Id. at 237.
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tort. '47  Although Lord Denning noted that such awards were
particularly appropriate in the context of "a contract for a holiday, or
any other contract to provide entertainment and enjoyment," 48 it was
not his view that such awards would be narrowly restricted to this
class of cases.49
In Heywood v. Wellers,5 ° the case of the Incompetent Solicitor, a
plaintiff client recovered mental distress damages from a solicitor
who negligently failed to enjoin a third party from molesting her.5
The defendant failed to institute the proper proceedings, and the
molestation of the client continued. 2 The court held that the injury
was reasonably foreseeable. 3 According to Lord Denning, damages
for distress could be awarded if, on remoteness grounds, the loss was
within the contemplation of the parties at the time of contracting.
Indeed, in Cox v. Philips Industries Ltd.," the trial judge awarded
damages for the mental distress to a plaintiff employee resulting
from an improper demotion. 6 Again, it appeared to be sufficient that
the loss was foreseeable. In due course, however, the ambit of Lord
Denning's innovation was curtailed. Cox was overruled." By 1991
it was generally accepted that Lord Justice Bingham's statement in
Watts accurately stated English law. That is, damages for mental
distress are restricted to cases where: (a) the very object of a contract
is to provide a pleasurable experience or peace of mind; or (b) where
the mental distress is coupled with and flows from physical
inconvenience. 9
Two recent decisions of the House of Lords appear to be capable
of unsettling this consensus on the shape of the modem English
47. Id. at 237-38.
48. Id. at 238.
49. Id.
50. [1976] Q.B. 446 (A.C. 1975) (U.K.).
51. Id. at 446-47.
52. Id. at 446.
53. Id. at 447.
54. Id. at 461.
55. (1976) 1 W.L.R. 638 (Q.B.D. 1975) (Eng.), overruled by Bliss v. S.E. Thames Reg'l
Health Auth., [1987] I.C.R. 700, 701 (A.C. 1985).
56. Id. at 638.
57. Id. at 644.
58. Bliss, [1987] I.C.R. at 701.
59. Watts v. Morrow, (1991) 1 W.L.R. 1421, 1445 (Eng.).
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doctrine. The first of the two, Ruxley Electronics & Construction
Ltd. v. Forsyth," involved a contract to build a swimming pool and a
related building in the garden of a residential property.6 The owner
stipulated for a maximum depth for the pool of seven feet, six inches,
apparently concerned that such a depth would ensure the safety of
the pool with respect to diving.62 Upon completion, the owner
discovered that the contractor constructed a pool with a maximum
depth of merely six feet, nine inches.63 The owner sought to recover
against the contractor for substantial damages in the amount of the
cost of demolition and reconstruction of the pool.' The court was
satisfied that the pool, as constructed, was perfectly safe to dive into,
that the deficiency in the depth of the pool did not decrease its value
and that if such an award were made, it was unlikely that the owner
would demolish and reconstruct the pool.65 In such circumstances,
their Lordships were unanimously of the view that awarding
damages to cover the cost of reinstatement was disproportionate to
the injury sustained by the owner, and such an award would amount
to a substantial gratuitous windfall.66 Moreover, if the plaintiff
actually intended to reconstruct the pool, it would be unreasonable
for him to do so.67 On the other hand, dismissing the claim in its
entirety on the basis that the owner suffered no diminution in the
value of the constructed pool as a result of the defect was also
considered unappealing.6" Accordingly, the House of Lords upheld
the trial judge's decision to award a sum of £2,500 general damages
for the loss of what the trial judge referred to as a "pleasurable
amenity."69  Of the five judges on the panel, only Lord Lloyd
explained the basis for such an award at any length.7" As Lord Lloyd
60. [1996] A.C. 344 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng. & Wales) (U.K.).
61. Id. at 344.
62. Id. at 354.
63. Id. at 362.
64. Id. at 353-54 (Lord Bridge).
65. Id. at 354, 359 (Lord Jauncey).
66. Id. at 362-63 (Lord Lloyd).
67. Id. at 363.
68. See id. at 351, 361 (stating that the diminution in value theory was incorrectly applied by
the trial judge and finding that denial of all recovery for such a loss was equally unreasonable).
69. Id. at 363, 374.
70. Lord Mustill, with whom Lord Bridge agreed, simply stated that it was inappropriate to
restrict the options for calculating damages to either the diminution in value or the cost of
reinstatement, a seeming "contest of absurdities," and that the trial judge's award accurately
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noted, the trial judge, in making the initial award, considered himself
to be applying the well-established exception to the general rule
permitting such awards in cases where the object of the contract at
issue is one of affording pleasure.7' The owner's "pleasure was not
so great as it would have been if the swimming pool had been 7 feet
6 inches deep. ' 2
Lord Lloyd further observed, however, that application of the
exception of the present facts should not constitute "a further inroad
on the rule in Addis v. Gramophone Co. Ltd." but rather "a logical
application or adaptation of the existing exception to a new
situation."" The precise nature of the extension of the rule intended
here is not abundantly clear. Certainly, nothing turns on the fact that
a swimming pool is obviously an item constructed for the purpose of
providing a form of pleasure. Lord Lloyd indicated that a similar
award should be possible in a case of residential construction where
"the building does not conform in some minor respect to the contract,
as, for example, where there is a difference in level between two
rooms, necessitating a step."74 Of course, one can say that a contract
to build a home in precise accordance with the specifications is a
contract to provide a pleasurable experience for the client in the form
of a home in the precise condition desired. If Lord Lloyd is correct
that an award of compensation for non-pecuniary losses is
appropriate in these circumstances, it would appear that the breach of
virtually any consumer services contract is vulnerable to a similar
analysis.
In the typical case, consumers enter into contracts to acquire
goods and services in order to enjoy the emotional satisfaction of
giving effect to their preferences. On this view, the Ruxley decision
might be thought to create a rather substantial inroad on the Addis
principle in the context of agreements to supply goods and services
to consumers. A more restrictive reading of Ruxley might be that it
applies to the particular problem of resolving conflicts between
identified the owner's true loss and satisfactorily gave it a monetary expression. Id. at 361. Lord
Jauncey found it unnecessary to pronounce on the point as the award in this respect had not been
challenged. Id. at 359. Lord Keith agreed with Lords Jauncey, Mustill and Lloyd. Id. at 353.
71. Id. at 374 (Lord Lloyd).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
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competing expectancy measures in the form of diminution of value
and cost of reinstatement where neither alternative appears apposite.
Nothing in the various judgments rendered in Ruxley, however,
suggests such a limitation on its scope. Indeed, it is difficult to
articulate a principled basis for restricting awards for the loss of
pleasurable amenities to that context.
The second of the recent decisions, Farley v. Skinner,75 returns
us to the familiar context of a surveyor's defective report provided to
an intending home purchaser.76 In Farley, the plaintiff retained the
defendant to provide a report concerning a substantial country home
located some fifteen miles from Gatwick International Airport.77
Plaintiff specifically mentioned to the defendant his concern about
the possibility of aircraft noise and, given the location of the
property, asked that this matter be investigated.78 On the basis of a
deficient investigation, the defendant advised the plaintiff that the
property would not "suffer greatly" from such aircraft noise in this
particular location.79 So advised, the plaintiff purchased the property
and, upon moving in, became aware that at certain times of the day
the property was substantially affected by aircraft noise.8" The
plaintiffs claim for damages for loss of the pleasurable amenity of a
home free of such noise was successful in a trial decision ultimately
upheld by the House of Lords.81
Applying the two traditional exceptions to the Addis principle,
however, appears problematic in this context. First, could it be said
that the "very object" of the surveyor's contract was one of providing
pleasure, relaxation or peace of mind?82 Certainly, the Court of
Appeal in Farley found that the instruction concerning aircraft noise
was "'one relatively minor aspect of the overall instructions. '
With respect to the second exception-emotional distress resulting
from physical inconvenience caused by the breach of contract-it
75. [2001] UKHL 49, (2002) 2 A.C. 732 (H.L. 2001) (appeal taken from Eng.).
76. Id. at [6] (Lord Steyn).
77. Id. at [2]-[3].
78. Id. at [3].
79. Id. at [4].
80. Id. at [6].
81. Id. at [8], [17].
82. See id. at [13].
83. Id.
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may be objectionable that the inconvenience suffered as a result of
the property being affected by such noise is not "physical" in the
requisite sense. However, the House of Lords found neither of these
objections compelling.1
4
With respect to the first point, the exception could be applied if
"a major or important object of the contract was to give pleasure,
relaxation or peace of mind."85 It is not necessary that this objective
be the only-or indeed even the principal-obligation of the
contract. Lord Hutton stated that this should be a point considered to
be settled by the Ruxley decision, as it could not be seriously
maintained that the precise depth of the pool was the principal
obligation or very object of the contract. 6  In his view, it was
sufficient that the object in question, "whilst not the principal
obligation of the contract, is nevertheless one which he has made
clear to the other party is of importance to him."87  Lord Scott,
however, was of the view that it was important to the application of
the Ruxley analysis to a case of this kind that there is "no other way"
of compensating the injured party for the deficient performance other
than making an award for the non-pecuniary loss.8
The result in Farley could also be justified, in their Lordships'
view, on the basis that aircraft noise is capable of causing "physical"
inconvenience in the requisite sense, thus engaging the second
exception to the Addis principle. 9 Lord Scott observed that the
distinction between physical and non-physical inconvenience was
perhaps an elusive one.9" In his view, it was critical to distinguish
between inconvenience resulting merely from disappointment that
the contractual obligation has been broken and inconvenience or
discomfort to one's senses, the latter being compensable.9
In sum, the decision in Farley preserves the traditional Addis
principle and the basic structure of its two well-recognized
84. Id. at [16].
85. Id. at [22].
86. Id. at [48]-[50] (Lord Hutton).
87. Id. at [51].
88. Id. at [79] (Lord Scott of Foscote).
89. Id. at [57] (Lord Hutton).
90. Id. at [85] (Lord Scott of Foscote) ("The distinction between the 'physical' and the 'non-
physical' is not always clear and may depend on the context.").
91. Id. (explaining that if the cause of the inconvenience or discomfort affects the senses, for
example, sight, touch, hearing or smell, damages can be recovered).
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exceptions. Thus, Lord Steyn observed that "[i]t is ... correct...
that the entitlement to damages for mental distress caused by a
breach of contract is not established by mere foreseeability: the right
to recovery is dependent on the case falling fairly within the
principles governing the special exceptions. 92
In two respects, however, the "very object of the contract"
exception appears to have been expanded in at least two ways. First,
Farley clearly establishes the proposition that it is sufficient to
ground relief if the objective of pleasure or peace of mind is either a
significant object of the agreement-if not the very object of the
agreement-or it is one in which the object was clearly
communicated to the other party.93 On this view, any type of
contract could engage the exception if it contained a provision
having such an object and the provision was either an important one
or the importance of the particular object was clearly communicated.
Surely, it can then no longer be accurately stated that this exception
applies only to certain categories or types of contracts. Second, by
reaffirming the soundness of the Ruxley analysis in this rather
different context, the Farley decision suggests that in the context of
the provision of consumer goods and services, mental distress
suffered by the consumer as a result of the loss of a "pleasurable
amenity" will be compensable, provided that the distress is more
than mere disappointment resulting from the non-performance of the
agreement.
III. AUSTRALIA
Australian courts have essentially followed the English approach
to awarding compensation for non-pecuniary breach of contract
losses. The basic Addis principle is recognized and is considered to
be subject to the exceptions recognized in English law. This general
approach was confirmed by the High Court of Australia as recently
as 1993 in the important and leading decision in Baltic Shipping Co.
v. Dillon,94 the case of the Sunken Cruise Ship. On its facts, this was
a case in which an award for damages for emotional distress could
easily be justified on the basis of the exceptions to the traditional
92. Id. at [16] (Lord Steyn).
93. Id. at [25].
94. (1993) 176 C.L.R. 344 (Austl.).
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Addis principle.95 In their various judgments, however, members of
the High Court indicated both considerable scepticism with respect
to the foundations of the traditional rule and a variety of views with
respect to the rationales for the traditional exceptions.96 These views
are of interest in the present context and may be of use when briefly
described.
The plaintiff purchased a fourteen day holiday cruise from the
defendant shipping company.97 On the tenth day of the cruise, the
ship foundered and sank.98  As result, the plaintiff lost her
possessions and suffered certain injuries.99 She claimed for damages
under various theories, including $5,000 "'as [c]ompensation for
disappointment and distress at the loss of entertainment ....
With respect to this particular aspect of her claim, success on the
basis of the traditional principles is easily predicted. This was a
contract to provide a pleasurable vacation, and the sinking of the
vessel is surely to cause a high degree of emotional distress. This is
indeed the conclusion the court reached on this issue. °1 In reaching
that conclusion, however, various members of the court expressed
sharp criticism of the traditional approach." 2
In the leading opinion, Chief Justice Mason suggested that the
traditional rule "rests on flimsy policy foundations." ' 3 In his view,
the traditional Addis principle is based on a concern that
"compensation for injured feelings will lead to inflated awards of
damages in commercial contract cases, if not contract cases
generally."'" As anxiety is a normal concomitant of contractual
95. See id. at 362 ("[D]amages for injured feelings were recoverable in the action for
damages for breach of promise of marriage.").
96. Id. at 361-63 (Mason, C.J.); id. at 395, 405 (McHugh, J.).
97. Id. at 387-88.
98. Id. at 388.
99. Id. at 347.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 370-71 (Brennan, J.).
102. Id. at 369-70 (stating that the principle has "no application when... the 'disappointment
of mind' is itself the 'direct consequence of the breach of contract"'); id. at 379-80 (Deane &
Dawson, JJ.) (stating that the rule is "essentially pragmatic" but should not be applied to the
present case because it falls within an exception to the rule, where distress has been caused by
breach of a contract under which the party allegedly in breach is shown expressly or impliedly to
have agreed to provide entertainment or pleasure); id. at 395-96 (McHugh, J.) (stating that
although no rationales for the general rule are satisfactory, it should not be rejected by the court).
103. Id. at 362 (Mason, C.J.).
104. Id.
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breach, a contracting party should be deemed, or so it is argued, to
assume the risk of such injuries." 5 However, Chief Justice Mason
queried:
[W]hy the injured party should be deemed to take the risk
of damage of a particular kind when the fundamental
principle on which damages are awarded at common law is
that the injured party is to be restored to the position (not
merely the financial position) in which the party would
have been had the actionable wrong not taken place." 6
Turning to a consideration of the exceptions to the general
principle, Chief Justice Mason observed that in recent English cases,
the results were justified on the basis of the concept of reasonable
foreseeability.' 7 In his view, however, the then current English
position could not be explained on that ground.0 8 If the results could
be so explained, he suggested, there would be no need for a general
rule denying relief and a series of exceptions thereto.0 9 Perhaps
surprisingly, however, Chief Justice Mason concluded that the
restriction of relief to disappointment and distress resulting from
physical inconvenience could be defended on the following basis:
[A]s a matter of ordinary experience, it is evident that,
while the innocent party to a contract will generally be
disappointed if the defendant does not perform the contract,
the innocent party's disappointment and distress are seldom
so significant as to attract an award of damages on that
score. For that reason, if for no other, it is preferable to
adopt the rule that damages for disappointment and distress
are not recoverable unless they proceed from physical
inconvenience caused by the breach or unless the contract is
one the object of which is to provide enjoyment, relaxation
or freedom from molestation."
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 364.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 365.
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He went on to hold that the latter principle was applicable to the
present fact situation."' Surely it is difficult, however, to defend the
traditional principles on the basis that they afford needed protection
against the phenomenon of damage awards for insignificant
disappointment and distress. A satisfactory response to that problem
would be to adopt a principle simply denying recovery for
insignificant, non-pecuniary loss.
More searching criticism of the traditional rules was offered by
Justice McHugh. He examined the various justifications for the
traditional Addis principle and concluded that "[n]one of them is
satisfactory. ' 12 Justice McHugh also traced the rise and fall of
remoteness as a justification for the exceptions to the general
principle in English law and appeared unconvinced that the rejection
of what was essentially Lord Denning's view was defensible in
principle." 3 Justice McHugh concluded his analysis in the following
terms:
If the matter were free from authority, the object of an
award of damages for breach of contract [i.e. the
expectancy principle] and the principles of causation and
remoteness would require the conclusion that damage for
disappointment or distress, resulting from breach of
contract, was compensable if it was within the reasonable
contemplation of the parties when the contract was made.
No doubt in most cases, the disappointment would be so
negligible that the damage suffered could be regarded as de
minimis and ignored. But in other cases, it seems
unreasonable that the party in breach should escape liability
even though, at the time of making the contract, that person
knew that breach might result in the other party suffering
disappointment. 4
Justice McHugh went on to illustrate the deficiencies of the
traditional approach by hypothesizing a case in which "an agent had
agreed to purchase land on behalf of a principal knowing that, for
11. Id. at 366 ("In the present case, the contract, which was for what in essence was a
'pleasure cruise,' must be characterized as a contract the object of which was to provide for
enjoyment and relaxation.").
112. Id. at 395 (McHugh, J.).
113. Id. at396.
114. Id. at 404.
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many years, the principal had desired to purchase the land for the
purpose of expanding his or her business."'15 In such a case, where
the breach deprived the principal of the property, a claim for
damages for mental distress would be, according to Justice McHugh,
a compelling one that would be precluded by the traditional
principles."6 Nonetheless, he concluded that in the present case
where the traditional principles provided a basis for relief, it would
be inappropriate to consider overruling the traditional doctrine.'
A minority of the panel appeared less offended by the
deficiencies in the traditional English rules. Indeed, Justice Brennan
was of the view that the Addis principle and its exceptions could be
defended." 8 According to Justice Brennan, in terms of the general
principle, awarding damages for what amounts to the "subjective
mental reaction of an innocent party to a breach" would add an
element of uncertainty to the projection of potential liability, thereby
complicating the negotiation of agreements and, in the end, seriously
impeding trade and commerce.' In his view, these considerations
were peculiar to the institution of contracting and inapplicable to
measuring damages in a tort claim, thus justifying a difference in the
approach to compensation for emotional distress in contract and
tort.2 However, this rationale for the traditional Addis principle was
inapplicable for Justice Brennan in a case where the mental distress
was a "direct consequence of the breach of contract."'' In his view,
a "direct consequence" was to be distinguished from cases "where
disappointment of mind is no more than a mental reaction to a breach
of contract and damage flowing therefrom .. ."122 In such a case, he
continued, "the law has treated such a mental reaction as too
remote."' 23  On the other hand, he notes that where the
disappointment directly results from the breach of contract, the
disappointment of mind cannot be considered to be too remote.'24
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 405.
118. See id. at 369-70 (Brennan, J.).
119. Id. at369.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 368.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 370.
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Justice Brennan illustrated the point with a reference to Heywood v.
Wellers,15 the case of the Incompetent Solicitor, and a distinction
drawn therein by Lord Justice Bridge between the following:
"[M]ental distress which is an incidental consequence to the
client of the misconduct of litigation by his solicitor, on the
one hand, and mental distress on the other hand which is the
direct and inevitable consequence of the solicitor's
negligent failure to obtain the very relief which it was the
sole purpose of the litigation to secure." 126
Damages would be available in the second case but not in the first.
127
Hence, in Heywood itself, the mental distress was compensable
because it resulted from the defendant solicitor's failure to obtain an
order that was intended to preserve the plaintiff client's peace of
mind. 128 Accordingly, the traditional exception to the Addis principle
for cases concerning agreements whose object it is to provide a
pleasurable experience or preserve peace of mind could be
supported. On its facts, Baltic Shipping Co. was such a case and a
favourable result for this aspect of the plaintiffs claim was therefore
clearly warranted.
Justices Dean and Dawson exhibited less enthusiasm for the
traditional principles and suggested the following about the Addis
principle:
[W]here applicable, [the Addis principle] represents an
essentially pragmatic and judicially imposed assumption
which is to be made for the purposes of the application of
the second limb of the rule in Hadley v. Baxendale, that is
to say, it is to be assumed that disappointment or distress
flowing from the breach of contract would not have been in
the contemplation of the parties, at the time they made the
contract, as a likely result of breach.'29
Notwithstanding the fact that the rule was thus seen to be based on
"pragmatism rather than logic,"'3 ° Justices Dean and Dawson
125. [1976] Q.B. 446 (A.C. 1975) (U.K.).
126. Baltic Shipping Co., 176 C.L.R. at 370 (quoting Heywood, [1976] Q.B. at 463-64
(Bridge, L.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
127. Heywood, [1976] Q.B. at 464.
128. Id. at 459-60.
129. Baltic Shipping Co., 176 C.L.R. at 380-81 (Dean & Dawson, JJ.) (citation omitted).
130. Id. at 381.
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asserted that it was inappropriate to overrule the traditional doctrine
by judicial decision. 3 Accordingly, the only appropriate question to
consider was whether or not existing exemptions covered the present
fact situation. In their view, of course, recovery for mental distress
was justifiable on this basis.'
In this rather interesting decision, then, the various opinions
filed by members of the Australian High Court indicate the fragile
nature of the rationales underlying the traditional Addis principle and
its exceptions. Further, the opinions collectively offer some support
for the view that the traditional rule and its exceptions can be
grounded, with varying degrees of success, on the remoteness
principle. The interesting suggestion made by Justice Brennan, to
which we will return, was that the distinction between the general
principle and the pleasure principle rests on a distinction between
directly caused emotional distress and distress which merely
constitutes a consequential reaction to the defendant's breach of
contract.'33
IV. CANADA
Canadian courts in the common law provinces welcomed Lord
Denning's innovation in Jarvis v. Swans Tours Ltd.'34 with some
enthusiasm and created the impression, over the years, that they were
persuaded that favourable awards in such cases could be justified
simply on the basis of the remoteness principle.'35 In a very recent
Supreme Court of Canada decision, however, some lack of clarity
was created with respect to the question of whether this truly does
represent the position under Canadian law.
In the years following Jarvis, Canadian courts often applied the
new doctrine on the explicit basis of the remoteness principle and
often did so in a context where it would be difficult to characterize
the contract in question as one providing for pleasure or peace of
mind. Thus, damages for mental distress were awarded in cases
131. Id. ("[W]e are unable to agree with the suggestion to be found in some recent judgments
that it should now be effectively abolished by judicial decision.").
132. Id.
133. Id. at 367-68.
134. [1973] Q.B. 233 (A.C. 1972) (U.K.).
135. See, e.g., Kempling v. Hearthstone Manor Corp., [1996] 41 Alta. L.R.3d 169 (Can.);
Gourlay v. Osmond, [1991] 104 N.S.R.2d 155 (Can.); Zuker v. Paul, [1982] 37 O.R.2d 161
(Can.).
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involving breach of warranty of title to an automobile,136 non-
completion of the sale of residential premises,137 and non-completion
of a sale of a condominium unit.' In Newell v. Canadian Pacific
Airlines Ltd.,39 the case of the Grieving Pet Owner, damages for
mental distress resulting from the loss of one pet and the injury to
another through the negligence of the defendant carrier were
awarded on the basis that the defendant was in a position to foresee
such consequences of a breach of this kind.14
Although some support was found at an early stage for an award
of damages for mental distress resulting from the manner of
dismissal in wrongful dismissal cases, 14 1 this topic was much
complicated by subsequent Supreme Court of Canada decisions. In
Vorvis v. Insurance Corp. of British Columbia,42 the Supreme Court
held that conduct that produces mental distress must itself constitute
a breach of duty, thus precluding relief in the typical case where
mental distress results from collateral conduct rather than the failure
to give timely notice of termination. 43 Liability for mental distress
caused by collateral conduct-harassment, imputations, etc.-is
imposed only if the collateral conduct itself constituted either a tort
or a breach of contract. However, this is often not the case. On the
other hand, in a later decision in Wallace v. United Grain Growers
Ltd.,'" the court held that although an employer's bad faith behavior
at the time of a wrongful dismissal did not constitute a breach of
duty, it may nonetheless result in the enhancement of damages
awarded for failure to give reasonable notice.'45 In Vorvis, Judge
Wilson, who in dissent was prepared to award damages for mental
distress resulting from the manner of dismissal, clearly grounded the
136. See Zuker, 37 O.R.2d 161.
137. See Gourlay, 104 N.S.R.2d 155.
138. See Kempling, 41 Alta. L.R.3d 169.
139. [1976] 14 O.R.2d 752 (Can.).
140. Id.
141. Kopij v. Metro. Toronto (Municipality), [1996] 29 O.R.3d 752 (Can.), rev'd, [1998] 41
O.R.3d 96; Brown v. Waterloo Reg'l Bd. of Comm'rs of Police, [1983] 43 O.R.2d 113 (Can.)
(overturning trial award for other reasons).
142. [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1085 (Can.).
143. Id.
144. [1997] 3 S.C.R. 701 (Can.).
145. Id.
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Jarvis line of authority on the remoteness principle.'46 The trial
judge held that the plaintiff was merely entitled to damages sufficient
to place him in the financial position he would have been in if he had
received timely notice of the dismissal.'47 Judge Wilson observed:
With respect, I think this is no longer the law. The absolute
rule has been whittled away by the numerous English and
Canadian authorities referred to by my colleague in which
damages have been awarded for mental suffering in a
variety of different contractual situations. It is my view,
however, that what binds all these cases together, their
common denominator so to speak, is the notion that the
parties should reasonably have foreseen mental suffering as
a consequence of a breach of the contract at the time the
contract was entered into.'48
Judge Wilson drew support for this position from Lord Denning's
judgment in Jarvis and from a similar pronouncement by the Ontario
Court of Appeal.'49 Subject to the occasional suggestion of a more
conservative approach from some Canadian courts,5 ° this was more
or less the stage of Canadian law prior to the very recent decision of
the Supreme Court of Canada in Fidler v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of
Canada. 5'
In Fidler, the plaintiff was receiving long-term disability
benefits from the defendant insurer due to fibromyalgia and chronic
fatigue syndrome.'52 The defendant terminated the benefits after an
initial two years of coverage, notwithstanding the plaintiffs
provision of medical evidence concerning her continuing
incapacities.'53 In making the decision to terminate, the defendant
relied on covert video surveillance but did not have substantial
medical evidence upon which to rely.'54 The plaintiffs claim for
146. Vorvis, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 40 (Wilson, J., dissenting in part).
147. Id. 136.
148. Id. 39.
149. Id. (citing Brown v. Waterloo Reg'l Bd. of Comm'rs of Police, [1983] 43 O.R.2d 113
(Can.)).
150. See, e.g., Turczinski Estate v. Dupont Heating & Air Conditioning Ltd., [2004] 246
D.L.R.4th 95 (Can.).
151. [2006] 2 S.C.R. 3, 2006 SCC 30 (Can.).
152. Id. 4-5,7-8.
153. Id. 8-10.
154. Id. 9-18.
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damages for breach of the covenant to furnish coverage included a
claim for the mental distress suffered as a result of the termination of
coverage.155
On this particular issue, Chief Justice McLachlin and Justice
Abella, writing for a unanimous court, held that this aspect of the
claim should enjoy success. 56 They offered considerable support for
the view that claims for damages for mental distress were simply
subject to the normal principles applicable to contract damages
claims more generally and, in particular, would enjoy success if the
injury was one that would have been within the reasonable
contemplation of the parties at the time of contracting.'57 As Chief
Justice McLachlin and Justice Abella wrote:
The aim of compensatory damages is to restore the
wronged party to the position he or she would have been in
had the contract not been broken. . . . "[T]he party
complaining should, so far as it can be done by money, be
placed in the same position as he would have been in if the
contract had been performed." The measure of these
damages is, of course, subject to remoteness principles.
There is no reason why this should not include damages for
mental distress, where such damages were in the reasonable
contemplation of the parties at the time the contract was
made. This conclusion follows from the basic principle of
compensatory contractual damages: that the parties are to
be restored to the position they contracted for, whether
tangible or intangible. The law's task is simply to provide
the benefits contracted for, whatever their nature, if they
were in the reasonable contemplation of the parties.158
In reaching this conclusion, the court noted the similar views it
expressed in Vorvis'59 and observed that the granting of damages for
mental distress in so-called "peace of mind" contracts "should be
seen as an expression of the general principle of compensatory
damages of Hadley v. Baxendale, rather than as an exception to that
155. Id. 11.
156. Id. 2.
157. Id. 44.
158. Id.
159. Id. 42 (citing Vorvis v. Ins. Corp. of B.C., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1085 (Can.)).
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principle .... "o On this view, damages for mental distress, like
other damages for breach of contract, are warranted by application of
the expectancy principle and are subject to the limitation placed
thereon by the principle of remoteness. Damages for mental distress
suffered in the context of vacation contracts and other "peace of
mind" contracts are recoverable because of the application of those
principles and not simply because of the nature of the contract in
question.
However, this rather clear and straightforward position is
complicated by a further element in Fidler that suggests an additional
element is required if a claim for damages for mental distress is to
enjoy success. Chief Justice McLachlin and Justice Abella
considered why not all mental distress associated with a breach of
contract is compensable and observed:
In normal commercial contracts, the likelihood of a breach
of contract causing mental distress is not ordinarily within
the reasonable contemplation of the parties. It is not
unusual that a breach of contract will leave the wronged
party feeling frustrated or angry. The law does not award
damages for such incidental frustration. The matter is
otherwise, however, when the parties enter into a contract,
an object of which is to secure a particular psychological
benefit. In such a case, damages arising from such mental
distress should in principle be recoverable where they are
established on the evidence and shown to have been within
the reasonable contemplation of the parties at the time the
contract was made. The basic principles of contract
damages do not cease to operate merely because what is
promised is an intangible, like mental security.161
Of course, one possible reading of this passage is that mental
distress damages will be available in a contract case only where "an
object of [the contract] is to secure a particular psychological
benefit."'62 This is reminiscent of the distinction drawn by Justice
Brennan in Baltic Shipping Co. between direct and consequential
mental distress.'63 If the contract imposes an affirmative obligation
160. Id. 43.
161. Id. 45.
162. Id.
163. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
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to secure a psychological benefit, the failure to provide it leads to
compensable injury. If, on the other hand, the mental distress is
simply a mental reaction to the breach of a covenant that does not
promise a psychological benefit, Justice Brennan would hold that the
mental distress is not compensable. It is not at all clear that Chief
Justice McLachlin and Justice Abella had a similar proposition in
mind when authoring the passage set out above. The ultimate
significance of this passage may not become clear until Canadian
jurisprudence on the point further develops."A
In light of the strong assertions made by Chief Justice
McLachlin and Justice Abella that the general principles of contract
damages apply to claims for damages for mental distress, it is
perhaps more likely that the apparent requirement that the contract be
one to "secure a particular psychological benefit" will be somewhat
loosely applied. Thus, in many cases where mental distress beyond
mere "incidental frustration" is a foreseeable consequence of the
breach, a court may determine that at least one of the objects of such
an agreement is to secure the "particular psychological benefit" of
not suffering such distress. This loose application of the standard
somewhat destabilizes the clear view of assimilating mental distress
damages to the general principles of expectancy and remoteness
expressed by Chief Justice McLachlin and Justice Abella in other
passages in Fidler.
V. UNITED STATES
American law more firmly rejects the possibility of damages for
emotional distress in contract cases than England and other common
law jurisdictions of the British Commonwealth. Thus, the general
rule appears to be that "[d]amages for emotional disturbance are not
ordinarily allowed." '165 Corbin justifies this traditional American
approach in the following manner:
164. The view that the Supreme Court of Canada now simply applies the rule in Hadley v.
Baxendale to contract claims for mental distress may now draw support from the recent decision
where the Court simply applied a reasonable foreseeability test. See Mustapha v. Culligan of
Can. Ltd., [2008] 293 D.L.R.4th 29, 2008 SCC 27 (Can.) (dismissing a claim for damages where
plaintiff alleged that finding a dead fly in bottled water led to a major depressive disorder, though
it was not consumed); see also Keays v. Honda Can. Inc., [2008] 294 D.L.R.4th 577, 2008 SCC
39 (Can.) (applying a straightforward remoteness test in allowing a claim for mental distress
caused by the manner of a wrongful dismissal).
165. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 353 cmt. a (1981).
[Vol. 42:51
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS IN CONTRACT
In most actions for breach of contract, the damages
recoverable are restricted to compensation for pecuniary
harm . . . . The breach of a contract practically always
causes mental vexation and feelings of disappointment by
the plaintiff, who seldom thinks of asking for a money
payment therefor. It is believed that an equivalent
pecuniary satisfaction for his pecuniary injury will
sufficiently restore the plaintiffs satisfaction, and the
intervening vexation is disregarded.'66
In justifying the traditional American reluctance to award such relief,
both Corbin and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts emphasize
the difficulty of measuring such injuries in monetary terms.'67 Others
have placed emphasis on the "potential for fabricated claims"16' as a
justification for strictly limiting recovery for mental distress. A
substantial body of American case law has awarded compensation
for mental distress arising from contractual breach. For example,
courts awarded compensation in cases where plaintiffs were
wrongfully ejected from a hotel'69 or by a carrier,' in cases where
undertakers provided defective services'7' and in cases against the
suppliers of defective caskets.'72 If it is well accepted that such
awards may be made in exceptional circumstances, the nature and
scope of the exceptions to the general rule denying recovery remain
unclear. However, the general themes emerging from such cases
appear more restrictive than the generalizations made regarding cases
awarding relief in other common law jurisdictions. Accordingly,
Corbin indicates that such relief is available in two kinds of
166. 11 ARTHUR L1NTON CORB1N, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 59.1, at 539 (Joseph M. Perillo
ed., rev. ed. 2005).
167. Id. ("[I]t can scarcely be said to be measurable at all in terms of money.");
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 353 cmt. a (1981) ("Even if they are foreseeable,
they are often particularly difficult to establish and to measure.").
168. Picogna v. Bd. of Educ., 671 A.2d 1035, 1037 (N.J. 1996).
169. Emmke v. De Silva, 293 F. 17 (8th Cir. 1923).
170. Austro-Am. S.S. Co. v. Thomas, 248 F. 231 (2d Cir. 1917).
171. Lamm v. Shingleton, 55 S.E.2d 810 (N.C. 1949).
172. Hirst v. Elgin Metal Casket Co., 438 F. Supp. 906 (D. Mont. 1977); see also Chelini v.
Nieri, 196 P.2d 915, 916 (Cal. 1948) ("The award of so-called 'general damages' is predicated on
defendant mortician's breach of a contract to preserve the body of plaintiffs mother and on
plaintiff's physical illness, suffering and disability resulting from his discovery that because of
such breach of contract the body became a 'rotted, decomposed and insect and worm infested
mass."').
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situations: "(1) cases where such suffering accompanies a bodily
injury; and (2) where it was caused intentionally or in a manner that
is wanton or reckless." '173  Certainly, modem authority can be
advanced to support the proposition that relief should be limited to
such cases.
A minority of courts limit recovery to the first situation, where
mental distress accompanies physical injury. In Keltner v.
Washington County,'74 for example, a teenage girl with knowledge
concerning the tragic details of the murder of a nine-year-old brought
a sympathetic claim.175  The plaintiff provided the relevant
information to the police on the faith of their oral promise not to
reveal her identity to the perpetrator of the crime.'76 In breach of the
promise, the police revealed the plaintiffs identity to the
perpetrator's attorney and, in due course, to the perpetrator, thereby
causing the plaintiff much mental distress and anguish.'77 However,
the Supreme Court of Oregon denied relief on the basis that the
distress was unaccompanied by physical injury to the plaintiff.'78
Other courts award recovery pursuant to the second situation,
justifying departures from the traditional rule where the defendant's
beach was wilful or wanton. In a recent bad faith insurer case,
Giampapa v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co.,"' the
Colorado Supreme Court awarded damages to a policyholder against
an insurer whose maltreatment of the insured constituted a wilful and
wanton breach of the insurer's duty to pay benefits to the insured.' 0
Clearly, if recovery for mental distress were limited to these two
categories-accompanying physical injury, and wanton and wilful
breach-the exceptions to the traditional rule would be quite limited.
Further, cases in both of these categories are also likely to constitute
tortious misconduct in addition to the breach of contract, thus it is
not surprising that damages for mental distress would be provided in
such circumstances.
173. CORBIN, supra note 166, at 539.
174. 800 P.2d 752 (Or. 1990).
175. Id.
176. Id. at 753.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 755 (citing Adams v. Brosius, 139 P. 729, 731 (Or. 1914)).
179. 64 P.3d 230 (Col. 2003).
180. Id. at 245.
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However, there are some reported cases that extend recovery
even though they fall outside two such narrowly conceived
exceptions. The cases referred to above allowing relief in the context
of defective services provided by undertakers offer an obvious
illustration. 8' Similarly, awarding relief where a gambling
establishment breached an undertaking not to permit entry to the
plaintiff's spouse cannot be explained by the traditional narrow view.
A further illustration includes the line of cases in which defendant
telegraph companies failed to make timely delivery of messages
concerning illness, death or funeral arrangements.'82 Such claims
have been brought by both the senders of such messages and their
intended recipients. Although they have enjoyed success,' Corbin
reports that two-thirds of the jurisdictions that have considered the
point have denied relief for mental suffering caused in such
circumstances.'84 Nonetheless, there are undeniably cases where
plaintiffs are granted relief. How are these decisions to be
explained? One suggestion is that the cases have a personal rather
than commercial character. 85  As John Sebert demonstrated,
however, it is difficult to justify differential treatment on this basis.'86
The division between the two categories is unclear, and it is plainly
the case that such awards are not invariably made in all cases of
contracts involving a personal element.
The distinction between personal and commercial arrangements,
however, bears a strong resemblance to the English restriction of
recovery to cases where a principal object of the agreement is to
provide pleasure, relaxation or peace of mind.'87 More promising is
the suggestion that these are cases in which there is a high degree of
probability that mental distress will be occasioned by breach. An
explanation of this kind appears in the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts. Section 353 states the rule in the following terms:
181. See Chelini, 196 P.2d at 916; Hirst, 438 F. Supp. at 908; Lamm, 55 S.E.2d at 813-14.
182. See, e.g., Curtain v. W. Union Tel. Co., 13 A.D. 253 (N.Y. App. Div. 1897).
183. See, e.g., id.
184. CORBIN, supra note 166, at 547.
185. John A. Sebert, Jr., Punitive and Non-Pecuniary Damages in Actions Based Upon
Contract: Toward Achieving the Objective of Full Compensation, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1565, 1588
(1986).
186. Id. at 1589.
187. Joseph P. Tomain, Contract Compensation in Non-market Transactions, 46 U. PITT. L.
REV. 867, 903 (1985).
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"Recovery for emotional disturbance will be excluded unless the
breach also caused bodily harm or the contract or the breach is of
such a kind that serious emotional disturbance was a particularly
likely result.'
' 88
In that Restatement version, then, damages for mental distress
can be awarded, even in the absence of physical injury or wilful
breach of contract, where the contract or breach is of such a nature
that serious emotional disturbance is a "particularly likely result."'89
As others have indicated, however, it may be seriously questioned
whether a high degree of foreseeability is manifest in such cases. 19 °
Arguably, what is unusual about such cases is that a high degree of
mental distress is a foreseeable consequence of breach and that the
cases can be explained, therefore, upon a simple application of the
rule in Hadley v. Baxendale.9' Although there is much persuasive
force in this opinion, straightforward judicial statements of this
approach are not easily found.'92
In sum, the traditional thrust of the American contract cases
awarding damages for mental distress do not appear to stray very far
from circumstances in which either physical injury was caused or the
defendant intentionally breached an agreement in circumstances
where the plaintiffs emotional disturbance was a foreseeable
consequence of that breach. In effect, the circumstances in which
American law permits such awards are cases in which concurrent
liability in tort often lies in the background. The American rules thus
appear to be much more narrowly circumscribed than the current
rules of, for example, English law.
As we have seen, English law permits recovery in cases where
"physical inconvenience," a much broader concept than physical
188. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACT § 353 cmt. a (1981).
189. Tomain, supra note 187, at 903.
190. See, e.g., Kent, supra note 9, at 503; Whaley, supra note 10, at 949-51 (suggesting the
adoption of two basic rules to control the recovery of emotional distress damages in contract; no
damages should be recoverable in contract actions unless they are foreseeable and "contractual
recovery requires certainty" (emphasis omitted)).
191. (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Exch. Ct.); see Eisenberg, supra note 8, at 565.
192. Cf Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 616 P.2d 813, 814-21 (Cal. 1980) (providing that
plaintiff husband would not be barred from recovering for emotional distress where it was a
foreseeable consequence of a doctor erroneously informing him that his wife had syphilis);
Sullivan v. O'Connor, 296 N.E.2d 183, 188-89 (Mass. 1973) (discussing recovery of damages for
emotional distress when surgery caused foreseeable injury, but no recovery for mental anguish
caused by breach of contract for transaction of goods).
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injury, has produced mental distress.193  Further, the English
exception permitting recovery in circumstances where the nature of
the contract is such that one of the important objectives is to give
pleasure, relaxation or peace of mind--or where such an object has
been clearly brought to the attention of the other party-appears
potentially broader than the American rule, as it does not require
wilful or intentional breach of contract as a condition of the
imposition of liability.'94
On the other hand, the American rule is potentially more
inclusive as it appears to cover all cases of intentional or wilful
breach bringing about foreseeable mental distress, regardless of the
type of contract in issue. To be sure, American law on this topic
appears to be evolving, and more specifically, significant support
exists for the view that damages for mental distress are recoverable
where such an injury is "particularly likely" or foreseeable.'95 To the
extent that this proposition may be considered to accurately represent
American law, the American rule may be converging with the
English doctrine that such awards are permissible only in cases
where a principal object of the contract is to provide pleasure,
relaxation or peace of mind.196
VI. ANALYSIS
A threshold issue when considering the merits of the possible
approaches under the common law regarding the question of
compensation for mental distress injuries resulting from breach of
contract is whether the case can be made for a rule denying such
relief across the board. On this approach, the expectancy principle
would stand for the proposition that the victim of a breach of contract
is entitled to be placed, so far as money can do so, in the financial
position the plaintiff would have been in if the contract had been
performed. As we have seen, the traditional approach in common
law jurisdictions has been to adopt a general principle against relief
193. See supra notes 28-31.and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
195. See, e.g., Tomain, supra note 187, at 903.
196. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
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of this kind.'97 The justifications offered for the general principle,
however, do not appear to be compelling.'98
Perhaps the two most frequently made arguments are that
damages for mental distress are difficult to measure and, second, that
the introduction of such uncertainty in the calculation of damages
inhibits the ability of negotiating parties to estimate future liability,
which in turn inhibits contractual activity.'99 With respect to the first
point, as many observers have pointed out, placing a monetary value
on mental distress is not obviously more difficult than placing a
monetary value on the pain and suffering that may accompany a
physical injury.2"0 Damages for a physical injury caused by a breach
of contract are plainly compensable. Further, whatever difficulties
may be entailed in placing a monetary value on mental distress, it is
an issue that courts face on a routine basis in tort claims. With
respect to the second point, in a complex contractual relationship of
any kind, the calculation of potential liabilities is often a complex
and difficult matter. Adding the potential possibility of an award of
damages for mental distress caused by breach is not likely to
significantly add to such difficulties. Such awards are likely to be
rare, and as experience in the Commonwealth jurisdictions has
suggested to date, the awards are likely to be quite modest in
nature.2"'
On an empirical basis, there appears to be little evidence to
suggest that awarding such damages in the context of ruined
vacations, for example, has had any impact on the willingness of
vacation service providers to enter into contracts with potential
customers. It is also occasionally objected that proving such claims
is inherently difficult and that granting such awards may provide an
opportunity to make spurious claims. 22 Again, experience in the
Commonwealth jurisdictions suggests that the ordinary burden of
197. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
198. See, e.g., Lamm v. Shingleton, 55 S.E.2d 810 (N.C. 1949); Baltic Shipping Co. v. Dillon,
(1993) 176 C.L.R. 344 (Austl.); Wilson v. Sooter Studios Ltd., [1988] 33 B.C.L.R.2d 241 (Can.);
Newell v. Can. Pac. Airlines Ltd., [1976] 14 O.R.2d 752 (Can.); Diesen v. Samson, [1971] S.L.T.
49 (Sheriff Ct.) (Scot.); Heywood v. Wellers, [1976] Q.B. 446 (A.C. 1975) (U.K.).
199. See, e.g., Kent, supra note 9, at 493.
200. See, e.g., Whaley, supra note 10, at 953.
201. See, e.g., supra note 39 and accompanying text.
202. See, e.g., Whaley, supra note 10, at 942-43.
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proof on the plaintiff to establish such a claim and the rigours of the
trial process are likely to weed out unmeritorious claims.2"3
The strongest argument in favour of granting at least some relief
in cases where mental distress has been caused by breach of contract
is that, otherwise, such plaintiffs are not adequately compensated for
a breach of contract. As we have seen, this is an argument that
appealed to a number of Commonwealth and American judges.2°" On
this view, the expectancy principle should not be restricted to
financial expectancy. Failure to award compensation for mental
distress caused by a breach under-compensates the plaintiff in cases
such as the Absentee Wedding Photographer, the Sunken Cruise
Ship, the Incompetent Undertaker or the Grieving Pet Owner.0 5 In
such cases, the mere return of the monies paid by the plaintiff will
very likely be perceived by the victim as under-compensation for the
breach.
Significantly, many judges appear to agree.0 6 Supporters of the
principle against recovery sometimes argue that the mental distress
resulting from a breach of contract is simply a risk of contractual
behaviour that is so pervasive that its risk ought to be borne by the
victim of the breach.20 7 Again, it is not at all clear why the victim
should be deemed to accept the risk in cases such as these where the
mental distress is likely to be quite severe and is reasonably
foreseeable by the perpetrator of the breach.
On the assumption that some cases of mental distress caused by
contractual breach should be compensable, one must turn to the task
of devising an appropriate line of demarcation between cases where
relief should be awarded and those where it should not. The
foregoing survey suggests a number of possibilities. A dividing line
might be based on the severity of the distress in question.
Alternatively, one might restrict liability to cases where some other
type of more easily provable injury is present, such as a physical
203. See, e.g., id. at 954.
204. See supra notes 111- 114, 151-160 and accompanying text.
205. Lamm v. Shingleton, 55 S.E.2d 810 (N.C. 1949); Baltic Shipping Co. v. Dillon, (1993)
176 C.L.R. 344 (Austl.); Wilson v. Sooter Studios Ltd., [1988] 33 B.C.L.R.2d 241 (Can.); Newell
v. Can. Pac. Airlines Ltd., [1976] 14 O.R.2d 752 (Can.); Diesen v. Samson, [1971] S.L.T. 49
(Sheriff Ct.) (Scot.); Heywood v. Wellers, [1976] Q.B. 446 (A.C. 1975) (U.K.).
206. See, e.g., Lamm, 55 S.E.2d 810; Baltic Shipping Co., 176 C.L.R. 344; Wilson, 33
B.C.L.R.2d 241; Newell 14 O.R.2d 752; Diesen, [1971] S.L.T. 49; Heywood, [1976] Q.B. 446.
207. See, e.g., Baltic Shipping Co., 176 C.L.R. at 362 (Mason, C.J.).
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injury, or to situations involving the commission of a tort.
Alternatively, one might limit relief to cases where particular types
of contracts have been entered into, such as those in which providing
a pleasurable experience or peace of mind are important objectives.
A further and related possibility would be to draw a distinction
between cases where the mental distress is a direct result of
contractual breach as opposed to merely an indirect consequence. As
envisaged by Justice Brennan in Baltic Shipping Co., this distinction
would allow recovery in cases where the mental distress is the
"direct and inevitable consequence" of the contractual breach rather
than a merely incidental consequence." 8 This distinction may be
coextensive with, or at least parallel to, the distinction between
contracts to provide a pleasurable experience of some kind, as
opposed to cases in which the victim suffers the disappointment
because of the defendant's failure to perform a different kind of
contractual obligation.
Finally, one may consider, as Commonwealth Courts have done
in recent years, the possibility that it is sufficient simply to rely on
the traditional common law concepts of causation, mitigation and
remoteness and to allow recovery where the mental distress was
caused by the breach, was not amenable to reasonable efforts of
mitigation and could reasonably be considered to have been within
the contemplation of the parties at the time of contracting.2"9
A distinction based on severity of mental distress suffered is
likely to be an inevitable component of a rule distinguishing between
compensable and non-compensable loss. Virtually all judges and
legal scholars who have analyzed the problem of compensation for
mental distress in contract cases indicate that damages should not be
allowed in cases of "ordinary" or "normal" disappointment or
frustration suffered by the victim of a breach of contract. 1 ° As Chief
Judge McLachlin observed in Fidler, "[iut is not unusual that a
breach of contract will leave the wronged party feeling frustrated or
angry. The law does not award damages for such incidental
frustration."21'
208. Id. at 400.
209. See, e.g., Heywood, [1976] Q.B. 446.
210. See, e.g., Baltic Shipping Co., 176 C.L.R. at 365.
211. Fidler v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can., [2006] 2 S.R.C. 3, 2006 SCC 30, $ 45 (Can.).
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Although there is widespread consensus in favour of the
proposition that normal disappointment, frustration or distress
resulting from a breach of contract should not be compensable, there
is less agreement on the reason for excluding compensation in such
cases. 21 2  Surely, Chief Judge McLachlin is incorrect in suggesting
that such losses are irrecoverable because they are not within the
reasonable contemplation of the parties .2 " There must be very few
commercial actors who do not appreciate that breaching a contract is
likely to cause disappointment, frustration or annoyance on the part
of the other party to the agreement. Perhaps Corbin comes closer to
the mark in suggesting that the victim seldom thinks of asking for a
monetary payment with respect to such feelings of disappointment
on the ground that pecuniary satisfaction will sufficiently restore the
plaintiffs equilibrium." 4 It might be said that ordinary frustration
and disappointment upon breach is not really an injury in the
requisite sense. Rather, it is only if the injury is severe or out of the
ordinary that the victim's mental state is characterized as one which
has suffered an injury. Although this dividing line between ordinary
and non-compensable disappointment and frustration and
compensable mental distress may appear to be difficult to draw,
Commonwealth courts, at least, do not appear to have encountered
much difficulty in doing so. 215  In sum, one limitation on
compensation for mental distress is likely to be that the distress must
be serious or severe in character" 6 and for that reason considered to
be a loss sustained by the victim as a result of a breach of contract.
212. See supra 91 and accompanying text.
213. Fidler, 2 S.R.C. 3, 2006 SCC 30, 45.
214. See CORBIN, supra note 166.
215. See Lamm v. Shingleton, 55 S.E.2d 810 (N.C. 1949); Baltic Shipping Co. v. Dillon,
(1993) 176 C.L.R. 344 (Austl.); Wilson v. Sooter Studios Ltd., [1988] 33 B.C.L.R.2d 241 (Can.);
Newell v. Can. Pac. Airlines Ltd., [1976] 14 O.R.2d 752 (Can.); Diesen v. Samson, [1971] S.L.T.
49 (Sheriff Ct.) (Scot.); Heywood v. Wellers,[1976] Q.B. 446 (A.C. 1975) (U.K.).
216. To the extent that American tort law may draw a distinction between compensable
"severe" emotional distress (for purposes of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional injury)
and the lower standard of compensable "serious" distress (for purposes of the tort of negligent
infliction of emotional distress), the appropriate standard for contracts cases would be "serious"
emotional distress. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS: PHYSICAL HARM RESULTING
FROM EMOTIONAL DISTURBANCE § 436 cmt. f, illus. 3. The higher threshold of "severe" is
imposed in the former context to restrict the potentially open-ended and excessive liability that
would otherwise be created by the tort. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR
PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 45, cmt. i (2007); see also id. §§ 45-47. This is not a
concern in the contracts context where the perpetrator is exposed only to claims by the other
contracting party. Similarly, Commonwealth courts that apply a "recognized psychiatric illness"
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A number of possible limitations on the recovery of mental
distress damages might be characterized as "parasitic" in nature.
One could consider restricting liability for mental distress for
contractual breach to cases where the breach also constitutes a tort.
Arguably, American law has not strayed terribly far from such a
principle. However, to the extent that damages for mental distress
are restricted to cases involving physical injury, it is difficult to
articulate a convincing rationale for excluding liability in all other
cases. A rule of this kind might be intended to identify cases of
severe mental distress. Of course, a more direct way of doing so
would be simply to allow relief only in cases of severe mental
distress, regardless of the cause.
Indeed, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that a rule parasitic
on physical injury is simply designed to find a convenient and
reasonably predictable basis on which to exclude general liability for
mental distress caused by contractual breach. Nor is there any
obvious policy reason for restricting compensation for mental
distress to cases in which other kinds of compensable injuries have
occurred. Moreover, Commonwealth precedent illustrates that there
are likely to be numerous cases of severe distress, quite foreseeable
at the time of contracting, that are not linked to a physical injury." 7
Such a rule excluding compensation therefore appears to lack a
rational foundation. A similar critique can be offered of the English
rule that permits recovery in cases where the plaintiff has suffered
"physical inconvenience" in addition to mental distress."' It is
difficult to articulate a policy basis for treating mental distress
compensable only where it is parasitic on "physical inconvenience,"
especially given the rather wide definition that concept has acquired
in recent English cases.
Similarly, restriction of mental distress damages to cases where
the breach of contract in question is intentional, wanton or reckless,
threshold in negligent infliction of emotional distress claims, do not apply the same high standard
in contracts cases. The leading tort cases that discuss the higher standard include White v. Chief
Constable of S. Yorkshire, [1999] 2 A.C. 455, 469 (H.L. 1998) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.)
(Goff, L.J., dissenting), rev'g Frost-v. Chief Constable of S. Yorkshire Police, [1997] W.L.R.
1194, and Tame v. New S. Wales (2002) 211 C.L.R. 317 (Austl.). Whereas the leading contracts
cases impose a much lower threshold. See Jarvis v. Swans Tours Ltd., [1973] Q.B. 233; see also
Farley v. Skinner, [2001] UKHL 49, (2002) 2 A.C. 732 (H.L. 2001) (appeal taken from Eng.).
217. See supra notes 168-186 and accompanying text.
218. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
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also appears difficult to defend. Liability in contract is normally
strict and not contingent upon a finding of wrongful intent. In
contract law, the emphasis is placed on the injury foreseeably
sustained rather than on the mens rea of the party in breach. 19 If the
reason for granting damages for mental distress is to give full
expression to the expectancy principle, it is difficult to fashion a
rationale for doing so only in the context of intentional breach of
contract. The plaintiff's injury in the Absentee Wedding
Photographer case is arguably as worthy of compensation as in a
case where the photographer's absence is spiteful, rather than the
result of a careless overbooking of appointments or, indeed, of a car
accident sustained by the photographer on the way to the wedding.220
Again, a rule restricting relief to intentional breach appears to
arise from a desire to impose a limit on recovery of damages for
mental distress. The resulting rule, however, appears unconnected
with the objectives for granting such relief. The tour packager
should be liable for the mental distress resulting from the Ruined
Holiday, whether or not the packager is in some sense personally
responsible for the failure of the holiday to live up to its advertised
virtues. 221 The objective, presumably, is to effect true compensation
rather than to punish the defendant for intentional breaches of
contract.
The proposal to draw a line between mental distress caused by
direct breach of contract and distress that is merely consequential to
a breach of contract is also vulnerable to criticism. 222 The proposed
distinction appears to run parallel to, if not coextensively with, the
English rule permitting recovery only where the contract breached is
one which has as a major objective the provision of a pleasurable
experience, such as a vacation, or the preservation of one's peace of
mind. It may also be coextensive with the requirement that the
contract breached must be one that has as an objective the securing
of a particular psychological benefit, which the Supreme Court of
Canada hinted at in Fidler.223
219. See supra notes 1-8 and accompanying text.
220. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
221. See supra notes 42-49and accompanying text.
222. See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
223. Fidler v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can., [2006] 2 S.C.R. 3, 2006 SCC 30, 45-48
(Can.).
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:51
Four objections to this requirement may be noted. First, the
distinction does not plainly distinguish between meritorious and
unmeritorious cases. Presumably, the mental distress caused in the
case of the Sunken Cruise Ship, the Incompetent Solicitor, and the
Ruined Holiday is direct and compensable. 4 It is less obvious that
the case of the Grieving Pet Owner falls on the "direct" side of the
line.225 Is the object of a contract of carriage to transport a pet from
A to B to please the owner by not killing or seriously injuring the
pet? While it is perfectly obvious that the accidental killing of
another's pet is likely to cause severe emotional distress, this is only
to say that the injury is foreseeable but not necessarily that the
avoidance of such distress is an explicit object of the agreement.'
Second, the hesitation one might feel over the proper
characterization of the Grieving Pet Owner case 22 suggests that the
distinction between direct and indirect loss is likely a manipulatable
one. One could say that there is an implicit obligation in the contract
of carriage relating to pets that the carrier should perform the
contract in such a way as to avoid causing the mental distress that
predictably would result from the killing or harming of the carried
pet. Accordingly, when the predictable mental distress occurs, one
could characterize the loss as direct. Perhaps it is true, however, that
in many cases-and possibly any case where mental distress
resulting from breach is foreseeable-one could characterize the
contract as one in which there is an implicit obligation not to cause
such foreseeable distress.
A third and related point is that the distinction between direct
and indirect loss appears to be merely a surrogate for the application
of the remoteness test. Losses which are directly caused by breach
may be considered obviously foreseeable, whereas those which are
indirect may not be obviously so. If this is the concern underlying
the direct versus indirect distinction, however, the problem is surely
more easily and plainly addressed by simply applying the remoteness
test itself.
224. See Baltic Shipping Co. v. Dillon, (1993) 176 C.L.R. 344 (Austl.); Heywood v. Wellers,
[1976] Q.B. 446 (A.C. 1975) (U.K.); Jarvis v. Swans Tours, Ltd., [1973] Q.B. 233 (A.C. 1972)
(U.K.).
225. See Newell v. Can. Pac. Airlines Ltd., [1976] 14 O.R.2d 752 (Can.).
226. Id.
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Fourth, the restriction of liability to direct losses-and similarly,
to losses occasioned by breaches of peace of mind contracts-are
intended to restrict recovery to cases where the injury is likely to be
severe. The Incompetent Undertaker and the Absentee Wedding
Photographer would likely cause severe disappointment and distress
to a person of ordinary sensibilities."' Perhaps it is this factor that
renders these cases attractive for relief as a matter of judicial
intuition. In this context we are less concerned about the potentially
spurious claim. The claim that severe distress has been caused is, in
the circumstances, credible. In other words, it may be that the
restriction to recovery in the context of this type of contract has
become a surrogate for identifying credible claims of severe distress.
If so, surely the more direct and better method of doing so is the
traditional device of imposing the burden on the plaintiff to establish,
on the basis of credible evidence, that severe distress has been
foreseeably sustained. The fact that the contract requires the
defendant to directly confer a psychological benefit or pleasurable
experience may assist the plaintiff in discharging that burden but
ought not be a requirement of doing so. Equally important, for
example, might be the communication of special circumstances to
the defendant at the time of contracting. 28
Finally, then, it may be considered whether it is sufficient to
simply rely upon the standard common law rules relating to
causation, mitigation and remoteness in awarding recovery for
mental distress caused by breach of contract. In assessing this
possibility, it is important to keep in mind the proposition set out
above to the effect that mental distress should be considered to be
compensable only in cases of severe and unusual distress. Where
such distress was caused by the breach of contract, the victim was
unable to mitigate the injury by taking reasonable measures and the
loss was so foreseeable as to be within the contemplation of the
parties at the time of contracting, the foregoing analysis suggests that
227. See supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text.
228. Thereby engaging the second or "special circumstances" branch of the rule in Hadley v.
Baxendale, (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Exch. Ct.). See Eisenberg, supra note 8, at 565; cf
Chelini v. Nieri, 196 P.2d 915 (Cal. 1948) (discussing an expectation of security as a special
circumstance in a defective casket case); Farley v. Skinner [2001] UKHL 49, (2002) 2 A.C. 732
(H.L. 2001) (appeal taken from Eng.) (discussing the purchaser's expectation that the subject
property would not be affected by aircraft noise as a special circumstance in a real estate survey
case).
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it is difficult to formulate a convincing reason for denying recovery
for the mental distress suffered. The Commonwealth and American
cases in which such relief is awarded appear to meet these criteria.
In the cases where relief seems inappropriate, it appears likely that
relief would be precluded by the application of these criteria.
Thus, the case that troubled Lord Justice Staughton-the ship
owner who combined a claim for unpaid freight with a claim for
mental distress resulting from non-payment-is not one in which
recovery will be granted.22 ' The distress is unlikely to be severe or
unusual. If it is, the severe overreaction is not likely to be
foreseeable and may well be caused by circumstances not disclosed
to the defendant. Reliance on these traditional and well understood
rules may, therefore, be the most straightforward and satisfactory
means for distinguishing between cases where mental distress
damages should be compensable and those where it should not be.
A further advantage of simply grounding the relevant analysis
on the traditional principles-and the principle of remoteness in
particular-is that the significance of a disclosure of one party to
another at the time of contract formation, concerning the particular
circumstances of the potential severe mental distress of one of the
parties, becomes quite clear.
None of the potential limiting principles considered above
clearly indicates whether a defendant who has caused such distress
by a breach of contract would be liable. Arguably, such a disclosure
might persuade an English court that a major object of the agreement
is to avoid mental distress of that particular kind. Certainly, there is
language in Lord Hutton's judgment in Farley that is supportive of
an analysis of this kind.23 Simple reliance on the remoteness
principle, however, would make it clear that the communication of
special circumstances relating to mental distress would engage
branch two of the rule in Hadley v. Baxendale23 ' and expose the
contract-breaker to potential liability.
229. See Hayes v. James & Charles Dodd, (1990) 2 All E.R. 815, 823 (Eng.).
230. See [2001] UKHL at [54].
23 1. See Eisenberg, supra note 8, at 565 (discussing the second branch of the rule regarding
foresight based on circumstances actually communicated); Turczinski Estate v. Dupont Heating
& Air Conditioning Co., [2004] 191 O.A.C. 350, 21-44 (Can.) (suggesting that special
circumstances may include an awareness of the plaintiffs fragile mental condition).
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VII. CONCLUSION
Briefly stated, the foregoing analysis of the limiting
mechanisms, developed by common law courts in various
jurisdictions for restricting the availability of damages for non-
pecuniary loss in the form of mental distress, suggests that each are
vulnerable to many criticisms. The principal rationale for granting
relief for mental distress is to give full effect to the expectancy
principle and not restrict the calculation of damages in contract
claims to awards which are designed to place the plaintiff merely in
the financial position that he or she would have been in if the
contract had been performed. This broader view of the scope of the
expectancy principle appears to enjoy fairly widespread support in
common law jurisdictions, other than those of the United States.
If one accepts this proposition, it then becomes difficult, though
not impossible, to explain why ordinary frustration or
disappointment resulting from breach of contract is not compensable.
Arguably, such feelings do not in any meaningful sense constitute
injuries that require compensation. Further, the existing limitations
on the availability for mental distress and damages recognized in the
various common law jurisdictions appear to lack a convincing policy
rationale. Indeed, in most instances, they appear either as artificial
attempts to simply restrict the scope of liability or as proxies for the
remoteness principle. A more satisfactory solution to the problem of
designing limits on recovery of damages for mental distress in
contract cases appears to be achieved by simply relying on the
traditional common law principles of causation, mitigation and
remoteness to preclude liability in cases where such claims lack
merit.
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